Population explosion in pakistan pdf




















On the other hand, the total fertility — the average number of children per woman — at the start of the transition was a lot higher in many poor regions than it initially was in Europe.

For South Korea, Brasil and the Congo, for example, the total fertility rate shortly after the Second World War at the start of their demographic transition is estimated to be 6 children per woman. In Belgium this number was close to 4.

In some developing regions, the fertility and birth rate decreased moderately to very fast, but in other regions this decline took off at an exceptionally sluggish pace — this will be further explained later on. As a consequence of these combinations of factors, in most of these countries the population explosion was much larger than it had been in most European countries. Nonetheless, the process of demographic transition has reached its second phase in almost all countries in the world, namely the phase of declining fertility and birth rates.

In a lot of Asian and Latin American countries, the entire transition has taken place and the fertility level is around or below the replacement level. South Korea for example is currently at 1. Crucial to the future evolution of the population is the further evolution of the birth rate.

Scenarios for the future evolution of the size and age of the population differ according to the hypotheses concerning the further evolution of the birth rate. The evolution of the birth rate is in turn dependent on two things: the further evolution of the total fertility rate the average number of children per woman in the first place and population momentum in the second.

The latter is a concept I will later on discuss in more detail. The role of the population momentum is usually overlooked in the popular debates, but is of utmost importance in understanding the further evolution of the world population. Population momentum is the reason why we are as good as certain that the world population will continue to grow for a while. The other factor, the evolution of the fertility rate, is much more uncertain but of critical importance in the long term.

The rate at which the further growth of the world population can be slowed down is primarily dependent on the extent to which the fertility rates will continue to decline.

I will further elaborate on this notion in the next paragraph. After that, I will clarify the notion of population momentum. A further decline remains uncertain there. Figure 4 shows the evolution per world region between and , plus the projected evolution until The numbers before illustrate three things.

First of all, on all continents there is a decline going on. Secondly, this decline is not equal everywhere. And thirdly: the differences between the continents remain large in some cases. Asia and Latin America have seen a similar decline in fertility: from 5. Their fertility level has been below replacement levels for years.

Africa has indeed seen a global decrease of fertility, but the average number of children is still at an alarmingly high level: the fertility merely decreased from 6. These continental averages hide a huge underlying diversity in fertility paths.

Figure 5 attempts to illustrate this for a number of countries. Firstly let us consider two African countries: the Congo and Niger. For the next decades a decline to 4 children per woman is expected. But that is not at all certain: it is dependent on circumstances that will be further explained in a moment. The demographic transition is after all not a law of nature but the result of human actions and human institutions.

Around , Pakistan and Iran had more or less the same fertility level as Niger, but both countries have seen a considerable decline in the meantime. In Pakistan the level decreased slowly to the current level of 3 children per woman. In Iran the fertility decreased more abruptly, faster and deeper to below the replacement level — Iran today has one of the lowest fertility levels in the world, and a further decline is expected.

The decrease started earlier than in Iran but happened more gradually. Today both countries have the same total fertility, below the replacement level. Which factors cause the average number of children to go down? The literature concerning explanations for the decrease in fertility is vast and complex, but two factors emerge as crucial in this process: education and child survival.

Considering child survival first: countries combining intensive birth control with very high child mortality are simply non-existent. The statistical association between the level of child mortality and fertility is very tight and strong: in countries with high child mortality, fertility is high, and vice versa.

This statistical correlation is very strong because the causal relation goes in both directions; with quick succession of children and therefore a lot of children to take care for, the chances of survival for the infants are lower than in those families with only a limited number of children to take care of — this is a fortiori the case where infrastructure for health care is lacking.

A high fertility level thus contributes to a high child mortality. And in the other direction: where survival chances of children improve, the fertility will go down because even those households with a lower number of children have increasing confidence in having descendants in the long term.

It is crucial to understand that the decline in child mortality in the demographic transition always precedes the decline in fertility. Better health care is therefore essential, and a lack of good health care is one of the reasons for a persistently high fertility in a country like Niger. Education is another factor that can cause a decline in fertility.

This is probably the most important factor, not just because education is an important humanitarian goal in itself apart from the demographic effects , but also because with education one can kill two birds with one stone: education causes more birth control but also better child survival recently clearly demonstrated by Smith-Greenaway , which in its turn will lead to better birth control.

The statistical correlation between level of education and level of fertility is therefore very strong. Firstly, education enhances the motivation for birth control: if parents invest in the education of their children, they will have fewer children, as has been demonstrated. Secondly, education promotes a more forward-looking lifestyle: it will lead people to think on a somewhat longer term, to think about tomorrow, next week and next month, instead of living for the day.

This attitude is necessary for effective birth control. The influence of education on birth control has been demonstrated in a vast number of studies James et al. It starts with primary education, but an even larger effect can be attained by investment in secondary education Cohen, Women who did finish primary school have on average 6. The fertility of Niger would be a lot lower if more women could benefit from education. The tragedy of that country is that too many people fall in the category of those without a degree of primary school, with all its demographic consequences.

One achieves with education therefore a plural beneficial demographic effect on top of the important objective of human emancipation in itself. It is one thing to get people motivated to practice birth control but obtaining actual effective contraception is quite another matter. Information concerning the efficient use of contraceptives and increasing the accessibility and affordability of contraceptives can therefore play an important role.

Investments in services to help with family planning are absolutely necessary and could already have great results in this group of women. There is often a problem of lack of motivation for birth control on the one hand, as a result of high child mortality and low schooling rates, and a lack of power in women who may be motivated to limit fertility but are confronted with male resistance on the other Blanc, ; Do and Kurimoto, Empowerment of women is therefore essential, and education can play an important role in that process as well.

Even if all the people would suddenly practice birth control much more than is currently considered possible, the world population would still continue to grow for a while. This is the consequence of population momentum, a notion that refers to the phenomenon of demographic inertia, comparable to the phenomenon of momentum and inertia in the field of physics.

Demographic growth is like a moving train: even when you turn off the engine, the movement will continue for a little while. The power and direction of population momentum is dependent on the age structure of the population. Compare the population pyramids of Egypt and Germany Fig. The one for Egypt has a pyramidal shape indeed, but the one for Germany looks more like an onion.

As a consequence of high birth rates in the previous decades, the largest groups of Egyptians are to be found below the age of forty; the younger, the more voluminous the generation. Even if the current and future generations of Egyptians would limit their fertility strongly as is indeed the case , the birth rate in Egypt would still continue to rise for quite some time, just because year after year more and more potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages.

Egypt therefore clearly has a growth momentum. Germany on the other hand has a negative or shrinking momentum: even if the younger generations of Germans would have a larger num ber of children than the generation of their own parents, the birth rate in Germany would still continue to decrease because fewer and fewer potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages.

The concerns about the consequences of population explosion started in the sixties. In the world population debate, the general concerns involve mainly three interconnected consequences of the population explosion: 1 the growing poverty in the world and famine; 2 the exhaustion and pollution of natural resources essential to human survival; and 3 the migration pressure from the poor South to the rich North Van Bavel, The Malthusian line of thought continues to leave an important mark on the debate regarding the association between population growth and poverty: Malthus saw an excessive population growth as an important cause of poverty and famine.

Rightfully this Malthusian vision has been criticized a lot. One must after all take the reverse causal relation into account as well: poverty and the related social circumstances like a lack of education and good health care for children contribute to high population growth as well. Concerning famine: the production of food has grown faster since than the world population has, so nowadays the amount of food produced per person exceeds that which existed before the population explosion Lam, Often regions with famine have ecological conditions permitting sufficient production of food, provided the necessary investments in human resources and technology are made.

The most important cause of famine is therefore not the population explosion. Famine is primarily a consequence of unequal distribution of food, which in turn is caused by social-economic inequality, lack of democracy and civil war. Poverty and famine usually have mainly political and institutional causes, not demographic ones.

Technological advancement in fertility treatment. Increase in immigrants and Refugees etc. Due to a high increase in the population, Pakistan is facing serious challenges like shortage of water, electricity, jobs infrastructure, public transportation, health, education law and order, and other social issues are prevailing in the society. The population is a big threat for Pakistan. China has reduced the birth rate and controlled the growth rate of population in a decent way. According to new trends and technology, the increased population with a high rate is dangerous for Pakistan.

It is time that new reforms may be introduced for family planning and awareness may be created among the masses regarding the disadvantages of Population.

Written by Shahzad F. Download this in PDF. Please Share your comments using Facebook ID. Shahzad F. View all posts. You may also like. Population In millions.



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